This is the standing public description of how Esign Comply records are created, sealed, and stored. It is versioned. Every evidence report and certificate refers to the version in force.
1. How a record is created
The customer builds the interface. Esign Comply renders nothing.
- The customer's server creates a session with a secret API key, naming the signer and the registered document versions. The response carries a short-lived client token for the browser.
- The signer's browser sends ceremony events straight to Esign Comply with that token. The customer's server is not in the path for evidence capture.
- Esign Comply stamps every event with its own server receipt time. The browser's clock is recorded separately, as reported, and is not verified.
- When the required steps are met, the completion request seals the record.
A record binds to the hash of the exact document version and the exact consent language presented. Versions are registered and hashed before the ceremony and are immutable.
2. Observed and asserted
Every evidence field carries one of two tags.
- Observed: seen by Esign Comply directly from the signer's device, or generated by Esign Comply. Examples: ceremony events, server times, verification results, integrity data.
- Asserted: supplied by the customer. Examples: the signer's name, email, and country, and facts sent with the session.
Esign Comply attests only to observed facts. Material a customer sends after signing is sealed on receipt, labelled customer-supplied, kept outside the record's sealed hash, and not verified.
3. Sealing
- Canonicalize. In the completion request, the record is serialized as canonical JSON (RFC 8785). A random 256-bit salt is added and a SHA-256 record hash is computed. The hash covers every event, document hash, and profile version.
- Chain. In the same database transaction, a ledger entry stores the record hash and the hash of the previous entry for the same domain. The ledger table is append-only; no application role can update or delete it.
- Seal. In the completion request, Esign Comply signs a receipt (JWS, ES256) over the record ID, record hash, signed-at time, domain, ledger sequence, and previous-entry hash. The key is held in a managed hardware-backed key service in a separate cloud account and never leaves it.
- Timestamp. An external timestamp authority issues an RFC 3161 token over the record hash. This is asynchronous, with a target of under 60 seconds. Two authorities are configured, with automatic failover.
- Checkpoint. Every 60 seconds, ledger entries are added to a per-region Merkle tree (RFC 6962 construction). A signed checkpoint states the tree size, root hash, previous root, and time, so each checkpoint names the one before it.
- Anchor. Checkpoint roots are timestamped by two external authorities, and protected batch bundles are written to write-once storage in a separate account. Public anchors are hourly, non-identifying aggregate commitments, published only after linkability testing. Record-level entries are never published.
- Prove. An inclusion proof for each record is computed against its checkpoint and stored.
A record is complete evidence at step 3. Steps 4 to 7 add independent proof of time and of non-removal. Public sealing keys, current and retired, are published at /.well-known/jwks.json.
Test-mode records are watermarked, kept out of the production ledger, and carry no attestation.
4. Verification
An evidence package carries what is needed to check it: the canonical record, the signed receipt, the timestamp token, the inclusion proof and signed checkpoint, the exact document bytes, and the public keys valid at seal time.
- Offline. The open-source verifier
esigncomply-verifyrecomputes the record hash, validates the seal against the bundled or published keys, validates the timestamp token against the authority's chain, and checks the inclusion proof against the checkpoint. It needs no network access. - Online. The public verification page and
POST /v1/verifyreturn proof status to a holder of exported proof or the full signed receipt. A record ID or hash alone reveals neither a record's existence nor its details. - Document check. A file can be hashed locally and compared with the record's content hash. The file is not uploaded.
5. Limits
Stated on every evidence report and certificate:
- Esign Comply did not see the signer's screen as a human would, did not verify legal identity unless a proofing partner was used, and did not review the agreement's content.
- "Our signature or seal, if present, authenticates this evidence artifact only. It is not the person's signature, a qualified certificate, or a determination of identity, authority, compliance or enforceability."
Limits of the individual layers:
- The external timestamp shows that the record hash existed no later than the stated time. It does not show when the person acted.
- At assurance level L1 the customer asserts the signer's identity, and a customer that scripts a fake browser could defeat the direct channel. L2 verifies control of an email address or phone number, not legal identity.
- The seal depends on Esign Comply's sealing key. External timestamps and anchoring make a compromise or a rewrite detectable.
- A rule pack listed on a record shows which rules were applied. It is not a statement that the record meets any law.
6. Retention and continuity
- Ten years is the standard maximum capacity on Starter and Unlimited while subscribed. It is not a legal term or an EU default. EU customers select a documented schedule by data class.
- Bulk export of all evidence packages is available at any time in every paid plan, subject to the Starter quota rules.
- On termination an EU controller elects return or deletion. For U.S. flows, records stay exportable for 12 months after cancellation.
- A recorded statutory floor or a scoped legal hold keeps the affected content until the floor expires or the hold is released.
- Signers keep access to their executed copies through the receipt link for the retention period, with 60 days' notice before a copy is removed.
- Sealing keys are rotated annually. Retired public keys stay published permanently.
- The verifier is open source. The specification requires this description and the public keys to be mirrored on a public code host. The Terms of Service, currently a draft for counsel review, carry a commitment to a 12-month export window on wind-down.
Version history
| Version | Change |
|---|---|
| 2026-11-21 | First published version. |